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ARBITRATION REFORM:  WHAT WE KNOW
AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
Peter B. Rutledge*
The future of commercial arbitration has become a center-
piece of the domestic congressional agenda.  According to one esti-
mate, ten different bills introduced in the 110th Congress would
chip away at the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments.1  By far the most significant bill, the Arbitration Fairness
Act, would retroactively invalidate arbitration agreements in all
employment, consumer, securities and franchise contracts.2  An es-
pecially vague provision in a prior version of the bill would invali-
date agreements involving claims under statutes intended to
protect civil rights or designed to regulate transactions between
parties of unequal bargaining power.3  Are these wise moves?
FRAMING THE DEBATE
In answering this question, I find it helpful to refer to Jean
Sternlight’s 2005 Stanford Law Review article.4  While Sternlight
and I may disagree on the ultimate answer to this question, we con-
ceptualize the issue in similar terms.  We approach it from one of
two vantage points.  We may apply some strong normative princi-
ples.  Alternatively, our answer may turn on one or more empirical
points about outcomes in dispute resolution systems.  As I hope to
make clear, these two vantage points are closely related.
The normative arguments typically align around two poles.  At
one polar extreme, defenders of enforceable arbitration agree-
ments point to freedom of contract values.  An agreement to arbi-
trate is nothing more than a contract to resolve a dispute
extrajudicially and in a private forum, and it serves neither the par-
ties’ interests nor society’s interest for these contracts to be invali-
* Associate Professor of Law, the University of Georgia Law School.
1 U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 110th Congress: Trial Lawyer Assault on Arbi-
tration Through Legislative Efforts/Earmarks, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_
doc.php?id=1089 (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
2 See Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2007).
3 See Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 1782/H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
4 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitrations: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631 (2005).
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dated.  At the other polar extreme, opponents of arbitration
agreements point to the lack of bargaining power or the lack of
information available to individuals in consumer, employment and
franchise contracts.
These conceptions, while perhaps easy to grasp intellectually,
are too facile and ignore the proper fault lines in the debate.  Ad-
vocates of enforceable arbitration agreements do not necessarily
embrace all agreements; rather they recognize that Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act provides that these agreements may be
deemed unenforceable on the basis of generally applicable contract
defenses.5  Conversely, opponents of enforceable arbitration agree-
ments do not necessarily oppose all agreements.  Even arbitration’s
harshest critics accept that such agreements can be enforceable,
provided that they are offered on a post-dispute (as opposed to a
pre-dispute) basis.6
Seen in this light, the positions in this debate yield some com-
mon ground and help to identify a more nuanced fault line than the
typical, if simple, divide between advocates of freedom of contract
and advocates of paternalistic regulation.  Both advocates and op-
ponents of arbitration embrace some degree of freedom of con-
tract.  Where they differ—and this is the first real fault line—is
over the conditions under which a contract will be enforced.  Op-
ponents of enforceable pre-dispute agreements submit that the in-
dividual often will have more—or, at least, better—information
after the dispute arises, in order to decide whether to consent to an
arbitration forum.
Yet the plausibility of this position depends on the definition
of “dispute.”  Consider the following example:  Suppose that I re-
ceive my cell phone bill and question certain charges on it.  When
does the dispute regarding these charges arise?  Is it when I receive
my bill, or when I first call the company to contest the charges?  Is
it when (but not before) I have consulted a lawyer about possible
claims against the company, or is it after the company (or I) has
filed a claim in federal or state court?  The answer to this question
is critical to proper resolution of the normative debate.  If a statute
defines “dispute” as having arisen chronologically too early, then
the underlying goal of enabling the individual to make decisions
with complete information is not advanced.  Alternatively, if “dis-
pute” is defined as having arisen too late in a given context, one
5 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
6 See John O’Donnell, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Custom-
ers, PUBLIC CITIZEN 4 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.
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may meaningfully preclude the essential cooperation upon which
successful commercial arbitration depends.
The second fault line concerns the baseline from which the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements will be evaluated.  Propo-
nents of enforceable agreements start from a baseline of
enforceability and then rely on courts to resolve questions of unen-
forceability on a case-by-case basis.  Conversely, opponents of en-
forceable agreements rely on a baseline of unenforceability and
then rely on the parties to enter into enforceable post-dispute
agreements on a case-by-case basis.  I return to the topic of post-
dispute resolution later in the article.
WHAT WE KNOW
If we shift from the normative issues to the positive ones, the
central question becomes whether arbitration is a superior form of
dispute resolution.  In beginning to answer this question, several
threshold challenges present themselves.
The first challenge is identifying the proper benchmark from
which to evaluate arbitration.  For example, should the goal be
maximum recovery for one party, speedier outcomes, maximum
win rates or lowest costs?  The answer to this normative question
fundamentally shapes this empirical inquiry.
The second challenge is to identify the proper point of com-
parison.  It is of little value to criticize arbitration if individuals
would be worse off without it.  As an example, a recent report on
arbitration in the consumer debt collection context bemoaned that
most debtors lose their cases in arbitration.7  But win rates in small
claims courts were no better; and, by contrast, the individual
debtor had to take time off from work to personally appear in
small claims court, whereas arbitration enabled the parties to pre-
sent their case without a personal appearance.8  Moreover, the re-
port failed to explain precisely where these disputes would be
settled if the underlying agreements taking them out of court were
no longer enforceable.  It would tax an already overburdened jus-
tice system, and prolong the time everyone else waits in the queue
for justice.
7 See id. at 13–17.
8 See Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration—A Good Deal for Consumers: A Response to Public
Citizen, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 11, 28 (2008), available at http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?id=1091 [hereinafter Response].
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The third challenge is comparability.  Two cases are rarely
identical, whether in their procedural posture, their underlying
facts, or their substantive legal rules.  Thus, it is difficult to com-
pare transactions across cases and attribute these outcomes to fea-
tures of the dispute resolution system in which they were resolved
unless other variables that might explain the difference can be
controlled.
These preliminary difficulties do not render the positive analy-
sis unmanageable but merely bespeak caution before drawing
broad conclusions about the matter.
With these background principles in mind, we can then turn to
the current state of knowledge about arbitration.  Certain baselines
are relatively clear.  Arbitration produces quicker results.  All of
the available studies have found the time from the commencement
of the dispute to its resolution is shorter in arbitration than litiga-
tion.9  A second empirical proposition, considered somewhat more
contentious, is that arbitration is cheaper than litigation.  The valid-
ity of that proposition depends both on how costs are allocated and
whether to include attorneys’ fees in the calculation.10  Some oppo-
nents of arbitration maintain that attorneys’ fees are not properly
included.11  Yet, that position takes an unrealistic view of the indi-
vidual’s perspective; it matters little to the individual whether she is
paying attorneys’ fees or arbitration fees.  At the end of the day,
both costs represent out of pocket expenses to her.
However, speed or cost might not be the appropriate baselines
from which to evaluate the desirability of arbitration.  Outcomes
might be much more important.  For this reason, it is critical to
examine the state of knowledge in each of the areas that the Arbi-
tration Fairness Act seeks to regulate:
Employment.  This is the area in which we have the most data
concerning outcomes.12  Much of the research concerns arbi-
trations conducted under the auspices of the American Arbi-
tration Association, one of the most respected, but certainly
not the only, provider of dispute resolution services.  In brief,
9 See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 571 (2008)
[hereinafter Whither]; Response, supra note 8, at 6.
10 See Whither, supra note 9, at 577–79.
11 See O’Donnell, supra note 6, at 8.
12 See Whither, supra note 9, at 556–60; Response, supra note 8, at 6. But see Taylor Lincoln
& David Arkush, The Arbitration Debate Trap: How Opponents of Corporate Accountability
Distort the Debate on Arbitration, PUBLIC CITIZEN 8–23 (2008), available at http://www.citizen.
org/documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(final).pdf.
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the data shows that individuals in arbitration generally obtain
outcomes comparable to, and in some cases better than, those
in litigation.
One exception to this trend appears in cases of individuals
earning income below a certain threshold, or those arbitrating
pursuant to promulgated (as opposed to individually negoti-
ated) agreements.13  Arbitration’s opponents cite as evidence
that the process systematically discriminates against lower-in-
come workers.14  Yet, cautious scholars have noted that there
may be more benign explanations, including both the fact that
meritorious claims for this cohort may settle at an earlier stage
and the fact that, absent arbitration, this group might not have
a day in court.15
Consumer.  Until recently, we only had more limited data on
outcomes, either in the form of reports provided by the arbi-
tration associations themselves, or by public interest groups.16
A very recent study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute sug-
gests that consumer arbitration generally produces positive re-
sults for individuals, whether measured by reference to
outcomes or costs.17  Apart from outcome studies, we have
some information about the rate in which various industries
utilize arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.18  Yet we
13 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 416–17 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg &
Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58
DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 48–49 (Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004).
14 See Lincoln & Arkush, supra note 12, at 8.
15 See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 13, at 50–52, 47–48.
16 See generally Mark Fellows, The Same Results as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing
Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes, 7/06 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 32 (2006);  American
Arbitration Association, Analysis of the American Arbitration Association’s Consumer Arbitra-
tion Caseload (2007), available at http://adr.org/si.asp?id=5027; California Dispute Resolution
Institute, Consumer and Employer Arbitration in California: A Review of Website Data Posted
Pursuant to Section 1281.96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.
mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print_aug_6.pdf; O’Donnell, supra note 6.
17 See Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer Arbitration Before the American Arbitration
Association (Mar. 2009).
18 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predis-
pute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63
(2004); Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts (forthcoming ), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1076968.  For industry-specific research involving the cellular
telephone industry, see Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 7
NEV. L.J. 37, 38 (2007); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated
Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 635 (2008).
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have virtually nothing on the economic impact of these
clauses, or how they influence the resolution of disputes
before they reach arbitration.
Franchise.  Among the areas regulated by the Arbitration
Fairness Act, this is the one about which we know the least.
Christopher Drahozal has done a series of thoughtful papers
analyzing the frequency with which such clauses are used and
their particular features.19  Beyond that, however, we do not
have adequate data on outcomes.
The bottom line is that the empirical picture is hazy:  Con-
gress cannot draw confident conclusions about the effect of in-
validating wide swaths of arbitration agreements, as the
Arbitration Fairness Act would do.  To the extent that empiri-
cal evidence permits predictions, it suggests a far more com-
plex picture than arbitration’s opponents would paint.
WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
If this is the state of affairs on what we know about arbitra-
tion, what is it that we don’t know—but need to know—about the
field?  Here, I would suggest four critical factors:
1) What are the outcomes?  We need more data for all areas,
but especially regarding consumer arbitration and franchise
arbitration.  Without this research, Congress is ultimately
flying blind on the matter.
2) Does post-dispute arbitration work?  This is a critical ques-
tion underpinning the fault lines in this debate.  If there is
empirical verification that post-dispute arbitration is effec-
tive, then the normative debate can appropriately take
place along the lines I have described above.  On the other
hand, if there is no empirical verification of the proposi-
tion, then the promise of post-dispute arbitration is a false
one.
We do not lack opportunities to investigate this hy-
pothesis.  In recent years, Congress has enacted two bills
19 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common (and
Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 81–83 (2002); Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair”
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 720–41 (2001).
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that invalidate arbitration agreements in discrete areas—
one in the automotive industry and the other involving mil-
itary servicemembers.20  To date, there has not been exten-
sive research on the impact of those laws on the outcomes
and costs of dispute resolution, nor on the economic impact
and frequency of “post-dispute arbitration.”  We should
learn more from these experiences in order to understand
the real impacts of broader reform.
3) What is the financial impact of arbitration?  As I have sug-
gested elsewhere, preliminary data suggest arbitration is
cheaper than litigation, both in the aggregate and for the
individual litigant (particularly under protocols that some
arbitration associations have adopted which cap the indi-
vidual share of the arbitration fees).21  If this preliminary
research proves valid, abolishing arbitration will result in a
net social cost, thus increasing the expense of resolving dis-
putes and benefiting only the lawyers.
4) What about the cases we never see?  One of the most criti-
cal, yet under-investigated aspects of arbitration is how it
fits into a company’s broader quilt of dispute resolution.
Studies of individual companies have shown two important
phenomena in this regard.  First, after a company adopted
an ADR program, of which arbitration was a part, the dis-
pute resolution costs dropped.  Second, when disputes did
occur, most of them could be solved before the dispute
reached the point of arbitration.22  If these experiences are
representative, legislation such as the Arbitration Fairness
Act may well be making consumers and employees worse
off.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the debate over arbitration will unfold on both norma-
tive and positive fronts.  These fronts are related, but involve dis-
20 See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006);
Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006).
21 See Whither, supra note 9, at 568.
22 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’ EX-
PERIENCE WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 18 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1997/gg97157.pdf.
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tinct sets of arguments and evidence.  On the normative side, the
debate turns on the question about the baseline from which the
enforceability of arbitration will be assessed.  On the empirical
side, we know a good bit about the speed and cost of arbitration,
but data remains incomplete about outcomes (whatever the appro-
priate measure).  Finally, there are at least four looming gaps in
our awareness of the broader empirical points, and it behooves
Congress—perhaps in the context of a GAO study—to discover
answers to these questions before acting precipitately as they are
poised to do through the Arbitration Fairness Act.
